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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
a Virginia resident and a nonresident defendant. 1°1 In holding that a mere
contract automatically did not confer personal jurisdiction within the con-
stitutional mandates of due process, the Fourth Circuit in Chung recognized
and protected a forum state's interest in preserving a nonresident defendant's
due process right. 105 By recognizing that a plaintiff's right to a convenient
forum in which to assert claims against a nonresident defendant must yield
to a nonresident defendant's due process rights, however, the Fourth Circuit
set forth guidelines that balance a state's conflicting interests.Y°6
LANCE 0. VALDEz
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Hoots v. Allsbrook: The Fourth Circuit's
Application of the Strickland Test for
Determining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to counsel.' The sixth amendment right to
counsel applies to both state and federal prosecutions.2 If unable to retain
104. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (mere contract insufficient to establish
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances in contract
cases establishing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants); notes 70-81 and accom-
panying text (Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Chung establishing lack of personal jurisdiction).
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
[a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defense." Id.
2. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932). In Powell the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required that in
state capital cases, trial courts must appoint counsel for defendants who are incapable of defend-
ing themselves because of ignorance or feeblemindedness. Id. at 71. The Supreme Court later
recognized that the sixth amendment right to counsel applied through the fourteenth amendment
to all state felony trials. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). The Supreme
Court has extended the right to counsel to all indigent misdemeanor defendants facing a possible
jail sentence. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972). The sixth amendment right
to counsel attaches when the government formally charges the defendant with a crime. See Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (sixth amendment does not apply until government com-
mences prosecution).
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counsel independently, criminal defendants have a right to counsel appointed
by the state.3 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized as a cor-
ollary to the sixth amendment right to counsel the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.4 In Strickland v. Washington' the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel during actual trial per-
formance and established a two-prong test for courts to apply in evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 6 Under Strickland's two-prong test
3. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-37 (if faced with possible jail sentence, indigent misde-
meanor defendants have right to counsel). The Supreme Court in Argersinger stated that the
assistance of counsel is requisite to the very existence of a fair trial. Id. at 31. Furthermore, the
Court in Argersinger stated that the right to have counsel appointed by the state applies in both
felony and misdemeanor offenses. Id. 32-36; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text
(discussing history of right to counsel).
4. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (sixth amendment entitles
criminal defendants facing felony charges to effective assistance of counsel); see also Gideon, 372
U.S. at 374 (fourteenth amendment protects right to effective assistance of counsel against state
action); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (sixth amendment entitles defendant to
assistance of counsel at preliminary hearing because preliminary hearing is one of critical stages
of criminal proceeding); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (effective assistance of counsel
is constitutional requirement of due process that no state may disregard); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942) (federal court may not deprive accused, whose life or liberty is
at stake, of assistance of counsel, because assistance of counsel is one of safeguards necessary to
ensure fundamental human rights of life and liberty); Avery v, Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446
(1940) (constitutional right to assistance of counsel includes opportunity for counsel to consult
and confer with accused to prepare defense); Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (1932) (when defendant is
unable to secure counsel or to represent himself adequately in state capital case, due process of
law requires court to appoint counsel at proper time so that counsel effectively can help prepare
case).
5. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
6. See id. at 686 (discussing various ways in which counsel may deprive defendant of ef-
fective assistance of counsel). In Strickland v. Washington the State of Florida indicted the
defendant for kidnapping and murder. Id. at 672. Acting against counsel's advice, the defendant
waived his right to a jury trial and his right to have an advisory jury presnet at the capital senten-
cing hearing. Id. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to death on three counts of murder, and
the Florida Supreme Court upheld the convictions on direct appeal. Id. at 675. Claiming, inter
alia, that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding, the defending
sought appellate relief from his death sentence. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of the differing standards for determining ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in the various circuit courts. Id. at 683-84. The Strickland Court outlined a test for deter-
mining ineffective assistance claims. Id. at 687; see infra text accompanying notes 7-8 (discussing
Strickland test requirements). The Supreme Court in Strickland stated that one of the purposes
of the sixth amendment right to counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial,
and not to improve the quality of legal representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The Supreme
Court in Strickland stated that another purpose of the sixth amendment right to counsel is to en-
sure that the public justifiably may rely on the outcome of the trial, Id. at 692-93. The Strickland
Court added, furthermore, that ensuring a fair trial was the guide for determining the effective-
ness of counsel in cases involving claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in cases involving claims of
ineffectiveness during counsel's actual performance of his duties. Id.
After articulating the general standards for judging ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
the Supreme Court applied those standards to the facts of the Strickland case. Id. at 698-701.
The Supreme Court in Strickland concluded that counsel's conduct was not deficient and that
1987]
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for determining effectiveness of counsel, a defendant must show first that
counsel's trial performance was deficient.7 Second, a defendant must show
even if counsel's conduct was deficient, the defendant could not show sufficient prejudice to war-
rant setting aside his death sentence. Id. at 698-99. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Strickland
determined that the defendant failed to satisfy the standards for proving ineffectiveness of
counsel. Id. at 698-701.
Courts have recognized three ways in which a defendant may be deprived of ineffective
assistance of counsel. A defendant may be deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel when
defense counsel functioned under a conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344
(1980) (assistance of counsel is ineffective when actual conflict of interests adversely affects
counsel's performance); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978) (same). A state may
deprive a defendant of effective assistance of counsel by interfering with defense counsel's ability
to render effective assistance for the accused. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976)
(state interfered with counsel's ability to render effective assistance by preventing attorney and
client from consulting during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858-64
(1975) (closing argument for defense is basic element of criminal trial, and state may not restrict
counsel who is defending criminal prosecution in accordance with constitutional traditions of
sixth and fourteenth amendments); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (state law
requiring that defendant be first defense witness unconstitutionally interfered with attorney's
freedom to decide how to present his case); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593-596 (1961)
(discussing state statute's bar on direct examination of defendant as unconstitutional interference
with attorney's ability to assist accused). A defendant also might be deprived of effective
assistance if counsel falls to render adequate legal assistance. See McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (counsel's advice with respect to guilty plea must be within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases). In Strickland the Supreme Court
elaborated for the first time on the constitutional issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in a
case involving a claim of an attorney's ineffectiveness during actual performance of his duties.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
7. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91 (discussing what constitutes deficient performance).
The proper standard for evaluating attorney performance is whether the attorney provided
reasonably effective assistance. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983)
(stating that standard of competence for counsel in criminal proceeding is reasonably competent
assistance). Reasonableness is an objective standard judged by prevailing professional norms. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (discussing reasonableness of attorney's actions considered in light of
all circumstances as guideline for determining effectiveness of attorney's performance in ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims). The Supreme Court in Strickland stated that representing a
criminal defendant involves certain basic duties such as the duty of loyalty, the duty to consult
with the defendant, and the duty to inform the defendant of matters concerning his trial. Id. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Strickland, the function of counsel is to assist the defendant,
and the attorney has a duty to use such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process. Id. The Strickland Court added that because of counsel's constitu-
tionally protected independence concerning trial strategy and the wide latitude counsel must have
in making tactical decisions, courts should not second guess counsel's decisions or allow hind-
sight to affect the court's evaluation of whether counsel's performance was reasonable under all
of the circumstances. Id. at 689. The Supreme Court in Strickland stated that in deciding an ac-
tual ineffectiveness claim, therefore, the court must judge the reasonableness of counsel's
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case as of the time of counsel's conduct. Id. at
690. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Strickland stated that courts presume that counsel has
rendered adequate assistance and has exercised reasonable professional judgment in making
significant decisions. Id. at 690.
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that counsel's deficient trial performance prejudiced the defense.9 In deter-
mining whether counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, some
courts have examined the cumulative effect of counsel's errors.' Other courts
have examined each of counsel's errors individually.' 0 In Hoots v.
8. See Strickland 466 U.S. at 691-96 (Supreme Court in Strickland discussing what con-
stitutes prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claim). According to the Supreme Court in
Strickland, even professionally unreasonable errors do not warrant setting aside the judgment of
a criminal proceeding unless the errors have prejudiced the defense unfairly. Id. at 691. The
Court in Strickland stated that in determining whether counsel's errors prejudiced the defendant,
a court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must consider the totality of the
evidence. Id. at 695. The Supreme Court in Strickland also stated that courts presume prejudice
in some sixth amendment contexts. Id. at 692. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Strickland
added that courts presume prejudice when actual or constructive denial of assistance to the
defendant exists. Id. According to the Supreme Court in Strickland, various kinds of state in-
terference with assistance of counsel will result in a presumption of prejudice. See id. (discussing
situations in which courts presume prejudice); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
n.25 (1984) (courts may presume prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or was
prevented from representing accused during critical stage of criminal proceeding). Courts also
will presume prejudice when an actual conflict of interests exists. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692
(discussing effect of conflict of interest on prejudice determination); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980) (considering prejudice when actual conflict of interest burdens
counsel). The Supreme Court in Strickland stated that to succeed on a claim that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance during actual performance at trial, however, a defendant affir-
matively must prove prejudice from his attorney's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693.
To prove prejudice in an actual ineffectiveness claim, the defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the proceeding would have resulted dif-
ferently. See id. at 693-94. The Supreme Court derived the Strickland standard for determining
prejudice from the foundation of the test for determining the materiality of exculpatory informa-
tion that the prosecution does not disclose to the defense and also from the test for determining
materiality of testimony that the government makes unavailable to the defense by deporting the
witness. See id. at 693-94 (discussing various standards for determining prejudice); see also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976) (test for materiality of exculpatory informa-
tion is whether withheld information creates reasonable doubt as to guilt of accused); United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1982) (test for determining materiality of
testimony made unavailable to defense because government deported witness is whether errors
had some conceivable effect on outcome of proceeding). In arriving at its standard for determin-
ing prejudice, the Supreme Court in Strickland rejected several other standards. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 693-94. The Court in Strickland determined that a test based on a standard requiring that
the errors conceivably affected the outcome was not sufficient. Id. at 693. The Supreme Court in
Strickland stated further that it is not sufficient for the defendant to show that the errors merely
"impaired the presentation of the defense." Id. The Court in Strickland noted that the defendant
need not satisfy the "newly discovered evidence" standard, however, which requires defendants
to show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case. Id.
9. See, e.g., Wilson v. McMacken, 786 F.2d 216, 218-20 (6th CIr. 1986) (applying
Strickland test individually and cumulatively to counsel's errors in determining ineffective
assistance of counsel claims); United States v. Cruz, 785 F.2d 399, 404-07 (2d Cir. 1986) (same);
McNeil v. Cuyler, 782 F.2d 443, 447-51 (3d Cir. 1986) (same).
10. See United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278, 1281-84 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Strickland
test individually to counsel's errors to determine prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel
claim).
19871
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Allsbrook"' the United State Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
the Strickland test to each individual error of counsel to determine whether
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.12
In Hoots police arrested and the state trial court indicted defendant
Hoots for the armed robbery of a restaurant in North Carolina. 3 The district
court for the State of North Carolina appointed Wilson 0. Weldon, Jr., a
North Carolina attorney, to represent Hoots as an indigent.' Weldon based
his defense of Hoots on the theories of alibi, misidentification, and third-
party commission of the crime, 5 At Hoots' first trial Weldon produced six
alibi witnesses to testify that Hoots was at home on the night of the robbery.
6
Weldon also attempted to introduce evidence showing that two other men had
committed the robbery.'7 At Hoots' trial, however, the trial judge refused to
allow testimony that a third party committed the crime." Hoots' first trial
ended in a mistrial when the jury failed to reach a verdict."9
At Hoots' second trial Weldon cross-examined the state's sole eyewitness
to the crime about her description of the gunman.20 Weldon also called alibi
witnesses on behalf of Hoots.2 Weldon did not attempt, however, to in-
troduce into the second trial evidence indicating that the other men had com-
mitted the robbery.2 The jury found Hoots guilty and sentenced him to 40
years in prison.
23
11. 785 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1986).
12. See id. at 1219-23 (discussing Hoots court's application of Strickland test for determin-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel).
13. Id. at 1215.
14. Id.
15. See Id. In Hoots Weldon presented witnesses to testify that Hoots was at home on the
night of the robbery. Id. at 1216. Weldon also cross-examined the state's sole eyewitness, Karen
Roark, about the robbery and about her identification of the gunman. Id. Furthermore, in an ef-
fort to prove a third-party commission of the crime, Weldon attempted to introduce into
evidence testimony from witnesses who claimed that they bad heard two men, Hayes and Shaw,
discuss and plan the robbery. Id.
16. Id. at 1216; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Weldon's plan of
defense). In Hoots Weldon also produced three witnesses, Harper, Ridge, and Meade, who
testified at Hoots' first trial and claimed to have witnessed two men, Hayes and Shaw, in various
stages of planning the robbery. Hoots, 785 F,2d at 1216.
17. See Hoots, 785 F.2d at 1216. As part of his planned defense of the defendant in Hoots,
Weldon attempted to show that third parties, Hayes and Shaw, instead of Hoots, committed the
robbery. Id. at 1216.
18. See id. at 1216, In Hoots the prosecution objected to Meade's testimony that he had
seen Hayes and Shaw together both before and after the robbery and that he had heard them
planning the crime. Id. The court sustained the prosecution's objection, Id,
19. Id. at 1215,
20. See id. In Hoots Weldon cross-examined Roark, the state's sole eyewitness to the rob-
bery, about discrepancies in her earlier descriptions of the gunman. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 1217 (discussing Weldon's decision not to introduce evidence to prove third
party commission of crime).
23. Id.
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On direct appeal Hoots dismissed Weldon as his attorney and secured
private counsel.2 ' Arguing that Weldon inadequately had presented to the
lower court the misidentification and third-party commission theories of
defense, Hoots claimed that Weldon's assistance was ineffective.25 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals rejected, inter alia, Hoots' claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and affirmed Hoots' conviction. 26 Hoots appealed to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected his claim for lack of a
substantial constitutional question. 27
After the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed his claim, Hoots
sought post-conviction relief in other North Carolina courts by again claiming
that Weldon's assistance was ineffective." The state trial court, however,
denied post-conviction relief.2 9 The North Carolina Court of Appeals also
denied Hoots' petition for review. 0 After the state trial court denied his mo-
tion for post-conviction relief, Hoots petitioned the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina for a writ of habeas corpus
arguing that counsel at the state trial provided ineffective assistance." The
district court referred Hoots' petition to a magistrate who recommended that
the court deny the writ? 2 The federal district court affirmed the magistrate's
findings, and Hoots appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit."
On appeal the Fourth Circuit in Hoots affirmed the district court's judg-
ment that Hoots had received effective assistance of counsel?" In determining
whether Hoots had received effective assistance of counsel, the Fourth Circuit






29. Id. In Hoots the Fourth Circuit noted that the state trial court ruled that Weldon effec-
tively had performed his duties by presenting the available evidence to Hoots' advantage. Id. The
state court further found that the evidence Weldon did not investigate or present was either not
probative or did not exclude Hoots as a participant in the robbery. Id.
30. Id. at 1218. In Hoots after the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied his petition for
post-conviction relief, defendant Hoots sought post-conviction relief based on newly discovered
evidence that he claimed would show that two other men had committed the robbery. Id. Hoots
claimed that the newly discovered evidence would exculpate him as the gunman. Id. The court
denied relief because the newly discovered evidence had not precluded the possibility that Hoots
robbed the restaurant and therefore, had not justified a new trial under state law. Id. On appeal
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, concluding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion
and that substantial evidence supported the lower court's conclusions, upheld the state trial




34. Id. at 1223.
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outlined in Strickland.3 The Fourth Circuit considered individually the three
bases of Hoots' claim that he was deprived of effective assistance of
counsel. 36 Hoots based his claim that Weldon was ineffective on the grounds
that Weldon inadequately investigated the defense of misidentification, that
Weldon should have researched the personal background of the state's sole
eyewitness and should have impeached her, and that Weldon prejudiced
Hoots' defense by failing to investigate the third-party commission defense.
37
In considering Hoots' claim that Weldon inadequately had investigated
the defense of misidentification, the Fourth Circuit determined that Weldon's
failure to investigate the defense of misidentification had constituted a defi-
cient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test.3 8 The Fourth
Circuit in Hoots reviewed the district court's finding that Weldon did not pre-
judice Hoots' defense by failing to interview and use the witnesses to the rob-
bery who could not identify Hoots. 9 Concluding that Weldon's failure to in-
vestigate constituted deficient performance, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether Weldon's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant under the
second prong of the Strickland test.4" The Fourth Circuit noted that the
Strickland test for determining prejudice required the defendant to show a
reasonable probability that counsel's unprofessional conduct altered the out-
come of the defendant's case. 4' The Fourth Circuit noted that the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland had defined the phrase "reasonable pro-
bability" as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome
of the case. 42 Applying Strickland, the Hoots court determined that Weldon's
failure to investigate the defense of misidentification did not prejudice the
defendant unfairly. 43 In examining the discrepancies in the description of the
robber, the Fourth Circuit determined that the discrepancies did not create a
reasonable probability that the court would have found Hoots innocent had
35. Id. at 1219.
36. Id. at 1219-23.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1219-20.
39. See id. at 1219-21 (discussing testimony of persons who witnessed the robbery). In
Hoots only one person in the restaurant where the robbery occurred could identify Hoots as the
gunman. Id. at 1216. Three other people in the restaurant when the robbery occurred could not
identify Hoots as the gunman. Id. at 1219. Weldon interviewed none of the three people who
were in the restaurant but could not identify Hoots. Id.
40. Id. at 1220.
41. Id.; Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
42. Hoots, 785 F.2d at 1220; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
43. See Hoots, 790 F.2d at 1220-21. In Hoots the Fourth Circuit stated that the state's sole
eyewitness enjoyed unique lighting advantages over the other eyewitnesses since she and the gun-
man were standing in the brightest part of the restaurant. Id. at 1220. The Hoots court deter-
mined that none of the other eyewitnesses would have testified that Hoots was not the gunman.
Id. The Hoots court determined that, in addition, Roark's unique lighting advantage over the
other people in the restaurant provided her the ability to identify Hoots even though the other
witnesses in the restaurant could not identify the gunman. Id.
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the other witnesses testified.," The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that
Hoots failed to show that his attorney's failure to interview and to use the




Turning to Hoots' claim that Weldon's failure to discover the eyewitness'
prior criminal record had constituted ineffective assistance of cousnel under
Strickland, the Fourth Circuit in Hoots determined that defense counsel or-
dinarily has a duty to investigate possible methods for impeaching prosecu-
tion witnesses. 46 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that Weldon's
failure to uncover easily discoverable information was deficient.4 7 The Fourth
Circuit decided that Weldon's failure to impeach the state's sole eyewitness,
however, did not create a reasonable probability that Weldon's error unfairly
prejudiced Hoots' defense."
The Fourth Circuit finally considered Hoots' claim that Weldon inade-
quately had investigated and presented the third-party commission defense.
4'9
Hoots contended that Weldon rendered ineffective assistance because Weldon
did not attempt to introduce evidence at the second trial that two men other
than Hoots had committed the crime.50 The Fourth Circuit noted that under
North Carolina law evidence on the commission of a crime by a third party is
admissible only if the evidence points unerringly to the guilt of the third party
and to the innocence of the accused.5 ' The Fourth Circuit concluded that in
deciding not to attempt to introduce the evidence of the third party commis-
sion at the second trial, Weldon correctly had interpreted North Carolina
law. 12 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit determined that Weldon's failure in
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1221.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 1221. In Hoots the state's sole eyewitness had previous convictions on worth-
less check charges. Id. Weldon did not discover the state eyewitnesses' worthless check convic-
tions and, therefore, was unable to impeach the credibility of the state's sole eyewitness. Id. The
Hoots court concluded that, nonetheless, the state eyewitnesses' prior worthless check convic-
tions did not imply that the eyewitness was untrustworthy or unreliable. Id. The Hoots court
noted the difficulty in determining how a jury might react to various methods of impeachment.
Id. The Fourth Circuit in Hoots concluded that Weldon's failure to impeach the state's
eyewitness, therefore, did not create a reasonable probability that the jury would not have con-
victed Hoots had Weldon impeached the witness. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1221-22. At the first trial in Hoots Weldon introduced testimony that two
other men had borrowed a pistol and that a witness had seen the two men together before the
robbery. Id. The trial court, however, did not allow into evidence the assertion that two other
men had planned the robbery. Id. at 1222. Weldon, therefore, did not attempt to introduce cer-
tain testimony at the second trial showing that two other men had planned the robbery. Id.
51. Id. at 1222; see State v. Hamlette, 302 N.C. 490, 501, 276 S.E.2d 338, 346 (1981)
(stating North Carolina law that evidence of third-party commission of crime is admissible only
if that evidence points unerringly to guilt of third party and innocence of second).
52. Hoots, 785 F.2d at 1222.
1987]
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Hoots' second trial to attempt to introduce evidence that the judge already
had ruled inadmissible at Hoots' first trial was not ineffective assistance of
counsel.1
3
The dissent in Hoots argued that the majority incorrectly applied the pre-
judice prong of the Strickland test.' 4 The dissent agreed with the majority's
determination that Weldon's failure to solicit testimony from other
eyewitnesses and his failure to impeach the state's sole eyewitness with her
criminal record satisfied the deficiency prong of the Strickland test." The dis-
sent disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that Weldon's defi-
ciencies did not prejudice Hoots' defense. The dissent argued that the ma-
jority concluded, after evaluating the defense errors separately, that each er-
ror individually did not create a reasonable probability that Weldon's conduct
prejudiced Hoots. 7 The dissent contended that the Strickland test required
courts to consider, instead, the cumulative effect of all of counsel's alleged er-
rors in determining whether a reasonable probability existed that a different
verdict would have resulted if counsel had not erred.-" Accordingly, the dis-
sent in Hoots would have held that Weldon's errors prejudiced the defense
and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 9
The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether courts
should consider counsel's errors individually or cumulatively when determin-
ing prejudice under Strickland.60 The Hoots court's examination of each in-
dividual claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in determining prejudice
under Strickland is consistent with how the Fourth Circuit has interpreted and
applied the Strickland test in other ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
6'
53. Id. at 1222-23.






60. See infra text accompanying notes 61-101 (discussing differing opinions of federal cir-
cuit courts concerning application of Strickland test).
61. See Hoots, 785 F.2d at 1219-23 (applying Strickland standard for determining ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim); see also Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910, 914 (4th Cir. 1985) (ap-
plying Strickland standard in determining that counsel's performance was not deficient); Roach
v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1476-77 (4th Cir. 1985) (Roach court's application of Strickland stan-
dard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Williams v. Gupton, 627 F. Supp.
669, 672-74 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (applying Strickland standard for determining ineffective
assistance of counsel claim). The Fourth Circuit in Ballou v. Booker applied the two-prong
Strickland test individually to each of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Ballou, 777 F.2d at 914-15. In Ballou the state charged the defendant with rape. Id at 910. The
defendant claimed that counsel was deficient because he failed to investigate every avenue open
to him. Id. at 913-14. The Fourth Circuit in Ballou separately examined each avenue that the
defendant claimed his counsel should have taken, and the court determined that counsel's con-
duct was not deficient. Id. at 914-15. Because the Fourth Circuit in Ballou determined that
[Vol. 44:505
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
In Roach v. Martin,62 for example, the Fourth Circuit applied the Strickland
test individually and arrived at an independent conclusion on each of the
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.63 The state trial judge in
Roach sentenced the defendant to death for capital murder, criminal sexual
conduct, armed robbery, and kidnapping." The defendant filed a petition for
federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina. 61 The district court dismissed the defendant's claims and
the defendant appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 66 The Fourth Circuit in Roach
examined the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims individually
and determined that counsel's conduct was not deficient. 67 The Roach court,
therefore, did not reach the prejudice issue. 6" Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
in Roach dismissed the defendant's claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
69
The Hoots court applied the two-prong Strickland test for determining
ineffective assistance of counsel claims consistently with how the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has applied the Strickland stan-
dard.70 In United States v. Lewis7' a jury convicted the defendant in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana for
operating a fraudulent investment scheme. 72 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit,
counsel was not deficient in any of the individual ineffective assistance claims, the court did not
address the prejudice issue. Id. at 914 n.7.
Similar to the Fourth Circuit's application of the Strickland test in Ballou, district courts
within the Fourth Circuit have applied the two-prong Strickland test to each individual claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, in Williams v. Gupton, the District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina applied the two-prong Strickland test individually to each claim of in-
effective assistance of cousel. Gupton, 627 F. Supp. 669, 672-74 (W.D.N.C. 1986). The Gupton
court determined that petitioner's first claim failed both prongs of the Strickland test and that
the second claim did not show professional incompetence. Id.; see infra test accompanying notes
63-69 (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of Strickland standard in Roach v. Martin).
62. 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 1476-77.
64. Id. at 1467-69. In Roach v. Martin the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction on direct appeal, and after exhausting his state court remedies, the defen-
dant filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina. Id. at 1469. The district court referred the petition to a United States
Magistrate who recommended that the district court dismiss the petition and grant summary
judgment in favor of the State. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1476-80.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text, (discussing Fifth Circuit's application of
Strickland test in United States v. Lewis and Wicker v. McCotter); note 76 (discussing Fifth Cir-
cuit's application of Strickland test in Wicker v. McCotter).
71. 786 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1986).
72. Id. at 1279.
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the defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that he received inef-
fective assistance of counsel and that the court allowed inadmissible evidence
into the trial. 7 3 The Fifth Circuit in Lewis applied the Strickland test to deter-
mine whether the defendant suffered prejudice because of counsel's alleged
errors. 74 Considering separately the defendant's four claims of ineffective
assistance, the Fifth Circuit in Lewis concluded that none of the individual
claims established prejudice. 7" Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit in Lewis
dismissed the defendant's petition.
76
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's application of the Strickland test in Lewis,
in McNeil v. Cuyler77 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit applied the Strickland test both individually and cumulatively to decide
the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.78 The state trial court
in Cuyler convicted the defendant of first degree murder. 79 After the state
courts denied his post trial motions, the defendant filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion in which he claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 0 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania denied the petition, and the defendant appealed to the Third
Circuit. 8' The Third Circuit in Cuyler examined petitioner's ineffective
assistance claim by determining whether petitioner had satisfied the prejudice
requirement of Strickland.8 2 The defendant argued that absent the cumulative
effect of counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been
different.8 3 After examining the cumulative effect of counsel's alleged acts
and omissions, the Cuyler court concluded that counsel's conduct did not
73. Id. at 1283-86.
74. Id. at 1281.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1281-83. In Wicker v. McCotter the Fifth Circuit considered the defendant's in-
effective assistance of counsel claims separately. Wicker, 783 F.2d 487, 494-97 (5th Cir. 1986).
Although the defense requested the Fifth Circuit in Wicker to consider the alleged errors as a
whole, the Wicker court reviewed each claim separately and ruled on each individual claim
specifically. Id. at 494-97.
77. 782 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1986).
78. See id. at 449-51 (applying Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of
counsel claims); infra text accompanying notes 83-101 (discussing courts that apply Strickland
standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel claims both individually and
cumulatively).
79. Cuyler, 782 F.2d at 445-46.
80. Id. at 444-46.
81. Id.
82. See id. In McNeil v. Cuyler the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
examined whether the defendant met the Strickland prejudice requirement without first deter-
mining that counsel's conduct was deficient. Id. 450-51. In Strickland the United States Supreme
Court stated that a court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel case need not determine
first whether counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. The Strickland
Court instructed courts, instead, to decide ineffective assistance of counsel questions on the pre-
judice issue when possible. Id.
83. McNeil, 782 F.2d at 450.
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create a reasonble probability that the outcome of the trial would have dif-
fered." Accordingly, the Third Circuit in Cuyler dismissed the defendant's in-
effective assistance of counsel claim.8
Consistent with the Third Circuit's application of the Strickland test in
Cuyler, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Wilson v.
McMacken" applied the two-prong Strickland test both individually and
cumulatively in considering the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.87 In Wilson a jury in the state trial court of Ohio convicted the defen-
dant of murder."9 The defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on the
grounds that, inter alia, counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 89
The district court dismissed the petition, and the defendant appealed to the
Sixth Circuit. 90 The Sixth Circuit in Wilson held tht none of counsel's alleged
individual acts or omissions established ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland.9 The Wilson court added that even when the court examined the
alleged acts and omissions in combination, the defendant failed to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.'2 Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit in Wilson applied the Strickland test both individually and
cumulatively to decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
9 3
84. Id. at 451.
85. Id.
86. 786 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 219-20.
88. Id. at 217. In Wilson v. McMacken the defendant appealed to the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Judicial District which affirmed the conviction. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court
in Wilson dismissed sua sponte any further appeal as lacking a sufficient constitutional question.
Id. The defendant in Wilson filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Id. The defendant stated four grounds in sup-
port of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, including the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. The district court in Wilson referred the petition to a magistrate who recommended
that the court dismiss the petition. Id. The defendant in Wilson objected to portions of the
report, and the district court reviewed the report and dismissed the petition. Id. Subsequently,
the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 220.
89. Id. at 217.
90. Id. at 220.
91. Id. at 219-20.
92. See id. at 220. In Wilson the defendant based his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on three separate grounds. Id. at 218-19. The Wilson court determined that the cumulative effect
of petitioner's complaints concerning counsel's performance was no greater than the individual
grievances against counsel's performance. Id. at 219-20. Accordingly, the Wilson court con-
cluded that whether the court considered the petitioner's complaints separately or cumulatively,
the defendant failed to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for determining ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Id.
93. Id. at 218-20. Similar to the Sixth Circuit's application of Strickland in Wilson, the
United STates Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Smith approved the
cumulative application of the Strickland test. See Jones v. Smith, 772 F.2d 668, 669 (1 1th Cir.
1985). In Jones the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the holding of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama. Id. at 674. In that decision, the district court held that
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Similarly, in United States V. Cruz,9 ' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit considered the defendant's three claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel both individually and cumulatively.9 In Cruz the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the
defendant on six counts of narcotics and firearms charges.9 On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant in Cruz
stated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 97 The defendant con-
tended that, whether considered individually or cumulatively, counsel's errors
constituted ineffective assistance.9" The Second Circuit in Cruz accepted the
defendant's contention that the court should consider counsel's errors both
individually and cumulatively, but stated that to prevail the defendant must
satisfy both the deficiency and prejudice requirements of the Strickland stan-
dard. 99 After examining the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel both individually and cumulatively, however, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that Cruz had failed to satisfy his burden of proving either a deficiency
in counsel's performance or resulting prejudice.' 0 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit in Cruz dismissed the defendant's claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel and affirmed the district court's decision.' 0'
The Supreme Court in Strickland stated that the purpose of the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial and to ensure that the public justifiably may re-
ly on the outcome of that trial. 2 The Strickland Court failed, however, to
address specifically whether courts are better able to ensure a fair and reliable
trial by considering the individual effect or the cumulative effect of counsel's
errors in determining prejudice under Strickland.' 3 In determining prejudice
under the Strickland standard for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, the federal circuit courts have not explained why they have
counsel's actions satisfied the Strickland prejudice requirement when considered either separately
or in combination. Id.; see Jones v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1292, 1300 (S.D. Ala. 1984) (district
court in Jones applying Strickland standard both individually and cumulatively), aff'd, 772 F.2d
668 (11th Cir. 1985).
94. 785 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 404-05.
96. Id. at 401.
97. Id. 404.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 405.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 405, 408.
102. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92 (discussing purpose and goal of sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel as ensuring fair and reliable trial); Note, Federal Habeas
Review of Ineffective Assistance Claims: A Conflict Between Strickland and Stone?, 53 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 183, 193 (1986) (purpose of sixth amendment right to counsel is to ensure fair trial rather
than to improve quality of legal counsel).
103. See generally, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, (1984) (failure of Supreme Court in Strickland
to discuss issue of whether courts should examine counsel's errors individually or cumulatively in
determining prejudice).
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distinguished between the individual or the cumulative effect of counsel's un-
professional errors.'"4 The federal circuit courts have not explained, further-
more, why one application of the Strickland test is better than the other, nor
have they discussed whether it makes any difference how courts apply the
Strickland test.'10 Language from Strickland, however, suggests that the
Supreme Court intended courts to consider the cumulative effect of counsel's
unprofessional errors in determining prejudice.'06 Indeed, in outlining the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court repeatedly used the
plural form of the word "error."' 17 The Supreme Court in Strickland added,
furthermore, that courts must consider the totality of the evidence in deter-
mining if counsel's errors prejudiced the defendant.'0 8 The Supreme Court in
Strickland noted that, depending on the evidence in the case, some attorney
errors will have affected the outcome of the trial pervasively, while other er-
rors will have affected the outcome only trivially." 9 Furthermore, the
Strickland Court noted that counsel's errors are more likely to affect a verdict
which the record supports weakly than a verdict with substantial support
from the record." 0 The Strickland Court apparently realized that depending
on the particular facts of each case, the manner in which courts consider
counsel's errors in determining prejudice under Strickland might affect the
outcome of the trial. "' In applying the prejudice prong of the Strickland stan-
dard to each individual claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore,
courts fail to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate in Strickland that
104. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing failure of federal circuit courts to
explain reasoning behind their application of Strickland test for determining prejudice).
105. See generally, United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1986) (5th Circuit in
Lewis does not discuss why it applies Strickland individually); Wilson v. McMacken, 786 F.2d
216 (6th Cir. 1986) (6th Cir. in Wilson does not give reasoning for decision to apply Strickland
test both cumulatively and individually); McNeil v. Cuyler, 782 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1986) (3d Cir-
cuit in Cuyler does not give reasoning behind decision to apply Strickland test both cumulatively
and individually); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985) (Roach court does not mention
reasoning behind applying Strickland test individually).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 107-111 (discussing Supreme Court's language in ar-
ticulating prejudice prong of Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of
counsel claims).
107. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (discussing appropriate test for determining prejudice
under Strickland standard for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Hoots v.
Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1223 n.4 (Ervin, J., dissenting) (discussing Supreme Court's use of
word "errors" in Strickland in suggesting framework for determining prejudice from counsel's
unprofessional errors in deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims). Throughout
Strickland, the Supreme Court used the plural form of the word "error" to explain how courts
should evaluate counsel's conduct in determining prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel
cases. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96.
108. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
109. Id. at 695-96.
110. Id. at 696.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110 (discussing Strickland Court's considera-
tion of how counsel's errors might affect trial depending on particular facts of each case).
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courts should consider the effect of "counsel's unprofessional errors" in
determining prejudice.' 12 Furthermore, as the dissent in Hoots noted, making
a separate determination of prejudice on each of counsel's unprofessional er-
rors results in treating each attorney error as a separate petition making the
same claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.'I As the dissent in Hoots also
noted, while the attorney's individual errors independently might not have
prejudiced the defendant in Hoots, the sum of the attorney's errors may have
prejudiced the defense.'" Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Hoots erred by
not considering the cumulative effect of all of counsel's unprofessional errors
in determining prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland standard
for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims.'15
In Hoots v. Allsbrook the Fourth Circuit examined defendant Hoots'
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." '6 In evaluating Hoots'
claims, the Fourth Circuit applied the two-prong Strickland test for
evaluating counsel's effectiveness.' '7 The Fourth Circuit separately examined
each individual claim of ineffective assistance to determine if Hoots had
satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard for determining inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims.' Although the Fourth Circuit applied
the Strickland standard consistently with some circuit court decisions, many
circuit courts favor the cumulative approach of evaluating ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.'' Courts are better able to meet the sixth
amendment goal of ensuring a fair and reliable trial by considering the
cumulative effect of all of counsel's unprofessional errors in deciding ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims.'
20
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112. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text (analysis of language which suggests
that Strickland Court intended courts to consider the cumulative effect of counsel's unprofes-
sional errors).
113. See Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1223 (Ervin, J., dissenting) (discussing reasons
for considering cumulative effect of attorney errors in determining prejudice under Strickland).
In Hoots the defendant relied on two attorney errors to sustain his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Id. The dissent in Hoots stated that the majority's determination of prejudice under
Strickland treated the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as two separate petitions.
Id.
114. See id. at 1223-25 (discussing why cumulative consideration of attorney's errors in
Hoots would have satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland test and would have resulted in dif-
ferent outcome of trial).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 106-I 14 (discussing Fourth Circuit's misapplication
in Hoots of Strickland test for determining prejudice).
116. Hoots, 785 F.2d at 1219.
117. See id. (applying Strickland test to determine defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 35-53 (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of
Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel in Hoots).
119. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text (discussing how various federal circuit
courts have determined prejudice under Strickland).
120. See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for applying
Strickland cumulatively rather than individually in determining prejudicial effect of counsel's er-
rors).
[Vol. 44:505
